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It  is  apparent even  after  one  year of  adjustment  that  the sharp
drop in oil  prices that occurned  in late 1985  and  early 1986  raill
have  a profound  effect on the regional distribution  of empioyment
in the Unjted  States.  This paper  develops  and  implements  a
procedure  for quantifying the long-term  consequences  of lowen  oil
prices on employment  in each  of the fifty  states.  The  estimates
developed  are used  to determine  how  much  of the variation in state
employment  growth  during 1985  can  be attributed to the oil-price
decllne.  l{e  also use  the estimates  to gauge  the feasibility  of
political  action, such  as an oiI  jmport  tarjff,  that would  reverse
the decljne in oii  prices.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In mid-November  1985,  West  Texas  intermediate  crude  oiI  was  selling for"
$31  per barrel  .  By the end  of l"larch  1986,  its  price had  tumbled  to $11.50
per barrel.  That amounts  to a 63-percent  decline in less that five montns.
Rarely  in the history of markets  has  the price of such  an important  and
widely traded  commodity  changed  so much  jn such  a short period  of time.
Market  fundamentals  did not allow oi1 prices to remain  this  low for very
1ong. But it  is clear that expectations  have  changed  and  that, at least
for the foreseeable  future, oil  prices wilI  be substantially lower  than
pneviously  tho  ught.
This article  attempts  to detenmjne  how  much  of an effect lower  oil
prices wiIl  have  on employment  in each  of the fifty  states.  Such  an
analysis is essentjal to a proper  identification  of the sources  of regional
economic  growth  and  decline in comjng  years.  The  estimates  also allow us
to gauge  the political  support  for policies such  as an oil  import  tariff
that would  reverse  the effects of the oil-price  decline.The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Sections  II  and  III  describe  a
computational  model  used  to est,imate  the  long-run employment  effects  of a
change  in oi1 prices.  Estimates  of the enployment  effects resulting from  a
$5 decline in oil  prices are presented  in Section  IV.  In Section  V, these
estimates  are used  to evaluate  the importance  of the oi1-price shock  jn
explaining state economic  performance  during 1986.  In Section  VI  , the
estimates  are used  to assess  the pol  it.ical v.iabj  l  ity  of an oil  import
tariff.  The  main  points of the paper  are summarized  in Section  VIL
II.  CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK
The  basic computational  model  emphasizes  differences in state
endowments  of energy-producing  and  energy-consuming  industries as the
principai determinant  of interstate differences in the employment  effects
of lower  oi1 prices.  Employment  in each  state is written as the sum  of two
parts--one  that derives from  a reiative abundance  or scarcjty of energy
industries and  anothen  that is,  by construction, ident.ical  to the national
economy  in its  industl"y  composjtion. The  effect of lower  oil  prices on the
first  part depends  both on the responsjveness  of energy  employment  to
changjng  oil  prices and  on the extent to whjch  the state deviates  from  the
national average  in its  endowment  of energy  industries.  The  second  part of
the state economy  is  assumed  to  respond  to  oil  prices in  the same  way  that
the nation does,
To  develop  the model  formally, let  El. denote  the margin  by which
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enployment  in  energy industry  i  is  overrepresented  (+)  or unde  rrep  re  sented-J-
*
(-)  in state j.  The  E-.,  are defined  by hypothetjcally  withdrawing  workers
from  (or adding  workers  to)  a set of key  energy  industries, along  with the
nonenergy  workers  they directly  or indirectly  support, until  the employment
that remains  (or is  so built  up) is identical to the nation's in jts




Erj-Erj  = s''(Nr-Nr) for  every ith  energy industry.
In the above  equations,  E  denotes  actual state employment  in energy
industry i,  N, actual state nonenergy  employment,  and  s,i the ratio of
nationai employment  in energy  industry i  to national nonenergy  employment.
:t
The  term  N, denotes  the nonenengy  ernployment  in state j  that is directly  or




N. = I m.E..,
J  i  I  lJ
where  n- is the nonenergy  multiplier  for energy  industry i.  The  m-,  are
defined  to account  not only for the intermediate  demands  that key
industries make  on other industries, but also for the indirect effects that
operate  through  induced  changes  in personal  jncome.
In order to solve for the E].,  first  multjply (1) by m, and  sum  over
lJ  - 
I
all  of the key  energy  industries.  Then  combine  the resulting expression
with eq.(2) to obtain Ni.  By substituting the result into (l),  we  haveI
(3) ri, =  Hrt(E,r/Nr)  - s,AJ,
where  A= [i - !m,(E,r/Nr)l/[1  - nrrsiJ.
By  construction,  all  of the E;j will  be  zero  if  ErrlN,  = s.,  for all  i.
Thjs  would  be  the case  if  energy  industries  were  represented  in the state
in the same  proportions  as  they  are jn the nation.  Otherwise,  Ei, wiff
tend  to be  positive  when  Err/N,  > s.,  and  negatjve  when  Err/N,  < sr.
By  representing  the state economy  in thjs way,  we  can  express  the
response  in total state  employment  to changjng  oi1 prices  as
(4) aTr/T,  = i  (aEi/Ei)(Eij/Tj)(l+mi)  +
(aTlT)r  Ir(Ei  j-rfrl . tnr-ru])l/Tj  ].
The  percentage  change  in state employment  is a linear combjnation  of the
percentage  changes  in national energy  employment  (denoted  AEr/Er)  and
aggregate  national employment  (denoted  ATIT).  The  weights  in the sum
reflect  the extent to whjch  the staters endowment  of energy  industrjes
deviates  fr"om  the national average. If  energy  industries account  for the
same  shares  of employment  in the state as they do in the nation, ATj/T,
reduces  to ATIT.  0n the other hand,  if  the state is  relatively
well-endowed  with energy-produc  i  ng jndustries (so that El'. t  O  whenever
AE. < 0) and poor'ly endovred  with  energy-con  s  um  i ng industrjes  (so that
E...0  whenever  AE.  > 0), then  aT./T. is  less than  AT/T  and  may  be
IJ  I  J  J




II].  DATA  AND  PARAMETER  VALUES
The  model  outlined in the previous  sectjon  was  used  to estimate  the
long-run  effects on state employment  of a $5 decline in the price of oil.
The  base  period for the ca'lculations  was  the year 1985. All  of the
employment  data are for that year.  The  average  price of ojl  jn 1985  was
$26.75  per barrel, as measuned  by U.S. refinersr acquisition cost.  Thus
the range  of oil  prices considered  in the analysis js from  $26.75  to
SZI  .75.  The  remaining  information  used  jn !he calculations is  summarized
bel  ow.
A.  The  Key  Energy  Industries
The  Iist  of key  energy  industries was  limited to three energy-produci  ng
industries--ol  l  and  gas  extraction (SIC  code  13), coal extraclion (i2),  and
oii  field  machinery  manufacturing  (3533)--and  two energy-consuming
industries--petroleum  refining (2911)  and  petrochemicals  (282 and  286).
This is certainly not an exhaustive  Iist  of industries that will  be
affected signjficantly  by the decl  ine in oi.l prices.  Ignored,  for example,
are airlines,  trucking, publ  ic utilities,  steel  , and  food  processing--alI
important  users  of energy.  To  the extent that these  industries are
unevenly  distributed across  states, our est'imates  will  be subject  to error.
Nevertheless,  it  is hoped  that the list  of key  energy  industries is
sufficiently  complete  to establ  ish at least the sign, if  not the order of
magnitude,  of the effect that cheaper  oil  will  have  on state employment.-o-
B.  Response  of Energy  Employment  to Lowen  0il  Prices.
To  determine  the effects of lower  oi1 prices on employment  in the ke!
energy  industries, multiple regression  techniques  were  used  to estimate
long-run  oi1-price elasticities  of natjonal energy  employment.  An  appendix
provides  jnformation  on the nature  of these  regressions. The  point
estimates  obtained  for the elasticities  are as follows: +1.01  for oil  and
gas  extraction, +1  .23 for oil  field  machinery  manufacturing,  +0.45  for coal
extraction, -0.56 for petroleum  refining,  and  -0.32 for petrochemicals.
The  functional forms  used  in the regressions  constrain  the elastjcities  to
be constant  with respect  to the price of oil.  To calculate changes  in
employment  over the oi1 price interval from  $26.75  to $21.75,  yile  used  the
formul  a
(s) AE,  '/8, = (21  '75/26  '75)\i -  1
where  f.  is the oil-price  elasticity  of employment  in energy  industry i.
C.  Enerqy  Empl  oyment  Multipliers
In developing  eq.(4), states were  assumed  to be identical except  for
differences in their  nelative endowments  of the key  energy  industries.  In
thls  case, there was  no need  to differentiate  the energy  employment
muitipliers  by state.  In practice, of course,  states are not identical;
nor do they have  the same  energy  multipliers.  Particularly troublesome  are
cases  in which  a state lacks a diverse nonenergy  sector.  A portion of the
multiplier  effects that stem  from  changes  in energy  employment  are then
lost to other states.  To  deal with this  problem,  we  used  state-specific-I-
multipljers when  evaluatjng  eq.(4).  This procedure  reduces  the
computat'ional  error for  states with an unusually  large amount  of leakage.
But it  fails  to acknowledge  and  adjust for the corresponding  jnjections
enjoyed  by exporting  states.  Presumably,  however,  the exporting  states are
large in relation to the nondiverse  states, so thal  a total  accounting  may
not be as crucial in their case.
The  theory requires  that each  multiplier  express  the effect on total
state employment  of a unit change  in employment  in energy  industry i
holding  constant  the level of output in alI  other key industries and  the
'level 
of autonomous  demand  in a1) non-key  industries.  This is a
nonstandard  type of multiplier,  and  to obtain it  requires  a special
inversion of an input-output  matrix.  To  develop  a set of these  rnultipl  iers
for all  states, v{e  first  used  a 1979  Texas  input-output  table to compute
the relevant  multipliers for the state of Texas. Multipliers for all  other
states were  then estimated  by adjusting the Texas  multipliers with
information  on state input-output  multipf  iers available from  the Bureau  of
Economjc  Analysi  s.
D.  Response  of National  Employment  to Lower  0il  Prices
Most  large-sca'le  econometric  models  provide  for a positive response  in
aggregate  emp  loyment  to fal  l ing oi  l  pri  ces.  Unfortunately,  most  of the
forecasting services  have  not widely dissemjnated  their  estjmates  of these
effects, confining their  publ  ished  figures to induced  changes  in gross
national product  (GNP). However,  by combining  the GNP  estimates  with those
few employment  estimates  we  could  obtain, we  were  able to establish a
consensus  estimate  of the effect of  lower  oil  prices on aggregate
empl  oyment.-6-
The  Forecastjng  Section  of the U.S. Chamber  of Conmerce  estjmates  that
a $5 drop jn the price of oi'l will  raise natjonal employment  by .45 percent
after  two years.  Estimates  from the Board  of Governors  of the Federal
Reserve  System  indicate that emp'loyment  will  be .7 percent  higher  as a
result of a $5 decline in oil  prices.  In comparison  to other macroeconomic
fonecasters,  these  two sources  are optimistic jn thejr  assessment  of the
expansionary  effects of lower  oi1 prices on GNP. Combining  the
relationship  between  GNP  growth and employment  growth found in  these two
sources  v/ith the consensus  estimate  of effect of lower  oi1 prices on GNP,
we jnferred that a g5 decline in the price of oil  would  be expected  to
raise national employment  by .4 percent.
IV.  NUMERICAL  ESTIMATES  OF  THE  EFFECTS  OF
LOWER  O]L  PR]CES  ON  STATE  EMPLOYMENT
Shown  in Table  l  are our estimates  of the percentage  changes  in state
employment  expected  after  long-run  adjustment  to a 95 decline in the price
of oil.  As can  be seen  from  the table, most  states gain employment.  But
for the few states that lose, the losses  are substantial.
Ten  states stand  to lose employment  as a result of the oil-price
decline.  They  are AIaska,  Colorado,  Kansas,  Louisiana,  New  Mexico,  North
Dakota,  0k1ahoma,  Texas,  West  Virginia,  and  hlyoming.  For  a 95 drop in o.il
prices, their  combined  loss is 216  thousand  jobs, or about  1.6 percent  of
their total  employment.  Each  of the ten losing states has  a concentration
of ene  rgy-produc  i  n  g industries that is well above  the national average.-9-
Four  of thenr--Louisiana,  0klahoma,  Texas,  and  tdest  Virg,inia--a1so  have
large shares  of energy-processing  employment.  But the positjve effects
from  these  industries are outweighed  by the losses  originating in energy
extraction.  This is part'ly because  enengy  extraction accounts  for a laroer
share  of employment  jn these  states than does  enengy  processing. It  is
also the case  that the ojl-prjce  elasticity  of extraction employment
exceeds  the elasticjty  for employment  in energy  processing.
For the other forty  states and  the 0.i  strjct  of Columbia,  lower  ojl
prices mean  expanding  employment.  A $5 decljne in the Drice of o.i  I  results
in an additional 606  thousand  jobs, about .7 percent  of thejr  total
employment.  Thirty-five  of these  states (and  the District  of Columbia)
have  nelatively small endowments  of energy  extraction.  The  other five
benefit from lower  oi1 prices, but Lheir percentage  gains  are less than the
national average. Of the eight states with the highest  percentage
employment  gains, s'ix have  among  the largest concentrations  of energy-
processi  ng emp  l  oyment.
V.  LOWER  OIL  PRICES  AND  1986  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE
The  sharp  decline in oi1 prices that began  in late 1985  undoubtedly
constitutes one  of the single most  important  economic  events  to shape  state
economic  activity  in 1986. Recognizing  that our estimates  represent
long-run  gains and  losses, we  nonetheless  found  the estimates  to be useful
in explaining state employment  growth  during 1986.-lu-
0f the ten states for whjch  the model  shows  a loss in employment,  eight
suffered employnent  declines  from 1985.IV  to 1986.IV. The  other two stares
grew  at rates below  the national average. 0f the six states for which  the
model  indicates employment  gains below  the national percentage,  one
suffered  an employment  decline, three grew  at rates below  the national
average,  and  two grev at rates higher than the natjonal average. 0f the
thirty-five  states (jncluding the District  of Columbia)  for which  the model
indicates enployment  gains higher  than the national percentage,  none
suffered an employment  1oss,  eleven  grew  at rates below  the national
average, and tvrenty-four grew  faster  than the nation.
To more  preciseiy measure  the degnee  of  correspondence  betv{een  our
estimates  of long-run  adjustments  to lower  oil  prices and  state economic
growth  in 1986,  we  regressed  the actual percentage  changes  in state
nonagricultural  employment  from 1985.IV  to l986.IV (ACTj)  on the percentage
changes  in employment  projected  by our model  for a one  dollar decline ,in
the price of oil  (M0DELr).  The  results are shown  be1ow,  with t-statistjcs
i  n Da  re  nthe  s  i  s.
ACTj =  1  .  18  +  8.  12  M0DEL'  i
(s.34) (s.oo) RZ  = .62
The  coefficient on  MODEL.  represents  the product  of the decline in long-run
oi1 price expectations  during 1986  and  the proportjon  of the iong-run
adiustment  to occur  riithin a year.  As such,  the regress.ion  assumes  that
the ratio  of short-run  adjustment  to long-run  adjustment  is  the same  for
every state.  It  is  likely,  however,  that employment  in oil  and  gasextraction adjusts  more  quickly to an oil-price  change  than does  employmenr
in coal extraction, refjning,  and  petrochemicals.  This l.irnjts  the ability
of the regressjon  to explain the observed  variation in state empjoyment
growth.  Nevertheless,  even  the simple  regression  indicates that lower  ojl
prices may  account  for as much  as 62 percent  of the varjation in employment
growth  across  states during 1986.
VI.  THE  POLITICAL  ECONOI.,IY  OF  AN  OIL  IMPORT  TARIFF
The  oi1-price decline and  subsequent  economic  downturhs  in energy-
producing  states have  led to renewed  debate  over an oi1 import  tariff.
Apart from the tariff  revenue,  the effects  on state empioyment  of a tarjff
that achieves  a 95 increase  in domestic  oi1 prices should  be opposite  in
sign, but equal in absolute  vaiue  to the figures presented  in Table  1.
Thus,  it  is possible  to use  these  figures to assess  the political  c1  imate
for an ojl  import  tariff.  Lacking  information  on economic  effects at the
sub-state  leve1  , we  will  assume  that indjv.idual  congressmen  vote in their.
state's  interest on this  issue, unless  otherwise  persuaded  through
1ogro1  Ii  ng.
If  senators  and  congressmen  vote in their  own  statets interest,  an oil
import  tariff  wi1l lose in both houses  of Congress.  The  vote would  be Z0
to 80 jn the Senate  and  62 to 373  in the House  of Representati  ves.  Is it
possible  that a different  outcome  could  be reached  through  iogrol  ling?
Assuming  no defectors  from  the camp  favoring the tariff,  31 votes  would
have  to  be swung  in  the Senate  and 156  votes in  the House  of
Representatives  for  the measul-e  to  succeed.-.LZ-
As indicated  by the figures in Table  1, representatives  from
Pennsylvania  would  seem  to have  the lowest  political  cost for  switching
their  votes  to support  an oil  import  tariff.  From  there, the political
cost of acquiring  votes  would  rise,  with senators  and  congressmen  from
Delaware  having  the hjghest  politjcal  cost.  This line of thinking suggests
that  jt  will  prove  extremely  djfficult  to obtain enough  votes to pass  an
oi'l import  tariff  of much  consequence.  The  marginal  senaton  would  come
from  Arizona  or Georgia  and  the marginal  congressman  from  California,  Iowa,
or lJisconsin. Both  marginal  voters, and  most  of the inframarg.inal  ones,
represent  states that would  suffer an employment  loss jn excess  of 1
percent  were  a tariff  adopted  that was  suffjcient  to raise the domestic
price of oil  by 910.
ViI.  SUI4MARY
The  sharp  decline in oi1 prices that occurred  late in 1985  and  early in
1986  will  serve  Lo redistribute employment  throughout  the United  States.
Evidence  of such  a redistribution can  already  be found  in the relative
growth  rates of state employment  in 1986. As  much  as 62 percent  of the
variation in state employment  gnowth  during that year can  be attrjbuted to
I  ower  ojl  prices.
A minority of states  will  suffer a
These  losses  will  be sizeable, but they
generate  po1  itical  support  for policies
domestic  oil  pri  ces.
loss of employment  in the long run.
would  seem  to be insufficient  to
that would  reverse  the decline in-t3-
Appendix:  Estimatjng  0il-Price  Elasticit.ies of Energy  Employment
For  oil  and  gas  extraction and  oil  field  machinery  manufacturing,
employment  elasticities  were  estimated  with a three-equation  system  using
as dependent  variables employment  in the tno energy  industries and  the
number  of  rotary  rigs  in  operatjon.  The rig  count was  assumed  to depend  on
the inflation-adjusted price of oi1, as measured  by U.S. nefjners'
acquisition cost of domestic  crude  oil.  Ernployment  jn the two energy
industrjes were  assumed  to depend  both on the real price of oil  and  the rig
count.  A formal presentation  of the model  can  be found  in Schmidt  (1986).
For purposes  of this  paper,  the model  was  re-estimated  using national data.
For coal extraction, we  first  regressed  coal employment  on the real
price of coa1.  The  estjmated  elasticity  was  1.86.  The  theoretical
response  jn the price of coal to changes  in oil  prices can  be expressed  in
terms  of the own-price  and  cross-price elasticities  of demand  for coal and
the own-prjce  elasticity  of coal supply.  By  using  thi s relationship,
together  with existing estimates  of the demand  elasticities  Isee  Bohi
(1981)] and  our estimate  of the own-price  elastjcity  of coal employment,  we
obtained  a value  of  .24 for the elast.icity of the prjce of coal with
respect  to the price of oil.  Together  the results imply  the oi1-price
elasticity  of coal employment  c.ited  in the text.
Elasticity  estimates  for petroleum  refining and  petrochemicals  were
made  by regressing  each  jndustry's employment  on the real price of oi'l and
real GNP. The  total  effect of a change  in the price of oil  was  defined  to
include  both the direct  effect and  the 'indirect effect that oDerates-l+-
through  induced  changes  'i  n real GNP. In conformity  with the estimates  of
the major  forecasting services, it  was  assumed  that each  10 percent  decljne
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